Abstract-The Internet is a hierarchical architecture comprising heterogeneous entities of privately owned infrastructures, where higher level Internet service providers (ISPs) supply connectivity to the local ISPs and charge the local ISPs for the transit services. One of the challenging problems facing service providers today is how the profitability can be increased while maintaining good service qualities as the network scales up. In this work, we seek to understand the fundamental issues on the "interplay" (or interaction) between ISPs at different tiers. Although the local ISPs (which we term peers) can communicate with each other by purchasing the connectivity from transit ISPs, there stands an opportunity for them to set up private peering relationships. Under this competitive framework, we explore the issues on 1) the impact of peering relationship, 2) resource distribution, 3) revenue maximization, and 4) condition for network upgrade. First, a generalized model is presented to characterize the behaviors of peers and the transit ISP, in which their economic interests are reflected. We study how a peer can distributively determine its optimal peering strategy. Furthermore, we show how a transit ISP is able to utilize the available information to infer its optimal pricing strategy, under which a revenue maximization is achieved. Two distributed algorithms are proposed to help ISPs to provide a fair and efficient bandwidth allocation to peers, avoiding a resource monopolization of the market. Last, we investigate the above issues in a "many-peers region," that is, when we scale up the network. We provide insightful evidence to show that the ISPs can still gain profits as they upgrade the network infrastructures. Extensive simulations are carried out to support our theoretical claims.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
O NE of the challenging problems facing today's Internet service providers (ISPs) is how we can increase the profitability and, at the same time, provide good performance to users as we scale up the network. For the Internet, it is a hierarchical architecture comprising heterogeneous entities of privately owned infrastructures. Generally speaking, the networks can be categorized into two types of service providers: 1) local ISPs, which consist of geographically close meshed networks and provide Internet access and connectivity services for consumers within their regions, and 2) large-scale ISPs, which traverse across large geographical distances, providing connectivity among the local ISPs.
For the local ISPs, in order to gain the Internet access, a common way is to purchase this service from higher level ISPs (or what we called transit ISPs). These transit ISPs set charges for the service provisioning, which depend on the allocated transmission bandwidth and the amount of transferred traffic. One important issue is to come up with a good pricing model for the current Internet, especially to reflect the economic roles of different ISPs. Currently, most ISPs adopt a flat-rate pricing scheme; that is, users pay a fixed amount of money to gain the Internet access in a certain period of time (usually on a monthly basis). Most broadband and ADSL services are examples of this type. Another approach is to charge users by the time that they connect to the Internet, following the charging methods employed in the telephony industry. Still, there are ISPs who charge users based on the actual traffic volume transmitted. There are some existing work that investigate the pricing strategy for the service providers. In [5] , the authors discuss how a provider should price its services differentially based on their characteristics such that prices can match service qualities. The authors in [6] also discuss how a cooperative pricing strategy can be presented to provide a fair distribution of profits to ISPs.
Besides relying on the transit ISPs for Internet access, local ISPs can also interconnect their networks together by signing up private peering agreements. For local ISPs that are geographically close to each other, there is an opportunity to exchange information between themselves and bypass the reliance on transit ISPs. One possible way to accomplish this is to establish a private peering link between two parties. In practice, these peering agreements can be quite complicated, involving many business considerations [16] , [7] . However, the basic nature of the peering relationship is to exchange local traffic between the two local ISPs through the peering link, without paying for the traffic transfer. Note that free peering is only one special case of the peering relationship: having charges on peers are also considered in more generalized circumstances. Usually, such a peering relationship is beneficial to both ISPs, since it can provide better performance and, at the same time, reduce the operating cost, since traffic does not need to go through the transit ISPs.
There are a number of existing works that explore the economics of network pricing with multiple ISPs on the Internet, some recent work being [18] , [2] , [11] , [22] . These authors all investigate a basic question: How can prices for the Internet services be set so as to fairly share revenues among providers and, at the same time, encourage the network to grow? Unfortunately, these work underestimate the impact of local peering relationship on the traffic demand, since this will influence the proper pricing strategy to achieve a maximization of the ISP's profitability. To bridge this gap, our work aims at seeking a fundamental understanding of the interaction between ISPs with peering links. We explore how the peering relationship can affect the service purchasing strategies and pricing strategies played by ISPs. For ease of presentation, in the rest of this paper, we term the local ISPs simply as peers, since they tend to establish peering relationships with each other. Similarly, we refer to the transit ISPs as ISPs. In this work, we are interested in exploring the interactions between the connecting peers and the interactions between the peers and the ISP. We also investigate the implications of these interactions.
To communicate with another local ISP, a peer has two options: either to use the connection provided by the transit ISPs or to use the peering link connecting the two peers. In spite of being given a constant transmission demand, deciding on an appropriate proportion of traffic delivered via these two connections is not a trivial matter. Another factor that makes the decision of traffic allocation difficult is that all peers are rational; that is, they want to maximize their happiness by transmitting/receiving traffic, and at the same time, they also care about the quality of service that they receive and the total payments for consuming the services. Also, one peer's optimal strategy may depend on the strategies taken by other peers and the pricing policy employed by the ISP. All these make it a challenging task to come up with an efficient resource allocation policy.
ISP, on the other hand, provides Internet access and connectivity between peers. Its goal is to maximize its own revenue by providing connectivity service. In order to maximize the total profit and attract more potential peers, a good pricing strategy is essential. In general, a transit ISP needs to address the following issues:
. Resource distribution. How should the ISP sell and allocate its capacity resource to the competing peers and, at the same time, avoid the monopolization of bandwidth resources by a small number of peers? . Maximization of revenue. Is there a unique price, by which the ISP's revenue can be maximized under a homogeneous pricing scheme (that is, all peers are charged using the same pricing model)? If it exists, how can one find this optimal price? . Upgrade of capacity. When more users demand for Internet access, more peers will enter the market. Is there an incentive for the ISP to upgrade the network infrastructures, that is, increase the backbone capacity to accommodate more peers? Does the increase in revenue compensate for the increased cost of deploying new services, or equivalently, does the marginal benefit of the ISP increase as the business grows? . Impact of peering relationship. A more tricky yet important question is, as the peer population grows, what impact does the private peering relationship have on the ISP's pricing decision? Although these questions have substantial impact and important implications, it is not straightforward to obtain an immediate answer. From the ISP's perspective, it is undesirable that its resource be utilized (or monopolized) by a small number of peers, since the ISP wants to achieve customer diversification. To attract or retain a peer for the connectivity service, an ISP has to perform a "fair" resource distribution, which avoids resource monopolization. To achieve this goal, the ISP and its peers have to exchange traffic information. Note that one has to consider a minimal information exchange due to business confidentiality and the necessity to perform resource allocation in a distributed manner. On the other hand, maximizing its own profit is also an important objective for the ISP. With a particular price offered by the ISP, every connecting peer decides the amount of traffic that it will send through the transit ISP. The aggregate traffic thus determines the total demand on the ISP link. Setting a lower price attracts more traffic from the peers, but this may lead to traffic congestion. Moreover, a low price does not guarantee the maximization of the ISP's revenue. Setting a higher price, on the other hand, may discourage peers from purchasing the ISP service, and the traffic demand will decrease, which does not ensure a maximal profit for the ISP as well. Therefore, finding an optimal unit price is an important issue.
The contribution of our paper is to answer the questions listed above. We explore the interplay or interaction between ISPs at different tiers, discussing issues on 1. the impact of peering relationship, 2. resource distribution, 3. revenue maximization, and 4. the possibility of network upgrade when we scale up the network.
. We present a generalized model to capture a snapshot of the current Internet, a hierarchy consisting of ISPs of two tiers with peering relationships. We believe that this two-tier interaction represents a basic element of the complicated system, characterizing the ISPs' behaviors, beyond which their economic interests are reflected. . We study how a peer can distributively determine its optimal peering strategy by solving a convex optimization problem. . We propose and compare two distributed algorithms, namely, the Proportional Share Algorithm (PSA) and Equal Share Algorithm (ESA), to help the ISP provide an efficient and fair bandwidth allocation to peers. We show that avoiding the monopolization of the market is not a trivial issue. . We further explore how a transit ISP is able to utilize its available information to infer an optimal pricing strategy, under which its revenue maximization can be achieved. . More importantly, we provide a fundamental understanding of the above problems in a many-users region, that is, when the network scales up: whether the ISP has any incentives of performing network upgrade, for example, increase the backbone capacity, so as to adapt more users entering the market. Equivalently, does the marginal profit of an ISP keep increasing as the number of users n ! 1? The organization of the paper is given as follows: In Section 2, we present our mathematical model and formulate the optimization problems for a peer and the ISP. In Section 3, we show the operating conditions for a peer to obtain the maximum utility under the special case that the traffic demand is constant. In Section 4, we extend the optimization to a general case and derive the operating conditions. In Section 5, we propose two algorithms for the ISP to distribute its resource among the peers. We carry out simulations to examine the performance of these two algorithms, respectively. In Section 6, we propose a methodology on how an ISP can estimate its optimal pricing strategy to maximize its revenue. We also present an example to illustrate the proposed procedure. In Section 7, we investigate whether the ISP has an incentive of upgrading the network when one scales up the number of peers. We provide simulation results and show that the ISP can benefit from upgrading the network, independent of whether private peering links exist or not. Section 8 presents the related work, and Section 9 concludes.
THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Consider a network, which is depicted in Fig. 1 . For clarity of presentation, Table 1 also lists all notations used in our mathematical model. The network consists of n peers and one ISP, where a peer can be viewed as a local ISP, 1 and the higher level ISP provides connection between these peers. Peers need to communicate with each other by sending data. They can communicate with each other either by sending traffic through the ISP or by the private peering links between themselves. In order to provide connectivity, the ISP has a communication network (in which we abstract it as a link) that has a total capacity of nC (in units of bits per second). For each peer i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; ng, it possesses an aggregate link to the ISP and, possibly, n À 1 private peering links connecting to the other n À 1 peers. Since the peering links are privately owned infrastructures by two parties, we use the terms "private links" and "peering links" interchangeably in the rest of this paper. Let l ij denote the peering link between peer i and peer j, and this link has a capacity of c ij (in bits per second). Note that if we set c ij ¼ 0, it implies that there is no peering link between peer i and peer j. The link connecting peer i and the ISP is denoted as l ii , and the ISP allocates C i amount of bandwidth (in bits per second) for this connection. Note that our model can be viewed as a generalization of the network model in [2] , in which private peering links are not considered.
Let x ij denote the transmission rate (in bits per second) from peer i to peer j. In short, it is the traffic that originated in peer i destined to peer j. To sustain the transmission rate of x ij , peer i obtains a utility of A ij ðx ij Þ, where A ij is a strictly concave function in x ij . As noted in [10] , a concave function is commonly used for representing elastic traffic, which is the dominant traffic in the Internet. The utility A ij ðx ij Þ represents the happiness of peer i by sending data to peer j at a rate of x ij . In this paper, we use a weighted log function as our utility function, and A ij ðx ij Þ ¼ w ij logð1 þ x ij Þ. The weighting w ij can be interpreted as the happiness weighting coefficient of transmitting traffic between peer i and peer j. Therefore, it is possible that w ij > w ik , which represents that peer i prefers to communicate with peer j than peer k. Note that the log function is chosen, as it leads to a proportionally fair resource allocation if proper congestion control is used. Additionally, this type of utility function is also commonly used for performing distributed admission control [2] .
The traffic transmission rate x ij , which has to be computed later, can either go through the ISP link l ii or the private link l ij . We denote y ij as the traffic rate that peer i decides to transmit 1. Unless we state otherwise, we use the term peer to denote a local ISP and the term ISP to denote a higher level ISP such as tier-1 ISP. Fig. 1 . A model of n peers and one ISP. Each peer has one aggregate link to the ISP and, possibly, n À 1 private links to other peers. Peer i can communicate with peer j in two possible ways: one is through the peering link l ij , and the other one is through the ISP link l ii . The traffic rate on link l ij is y ij , whereas the traffic rate on link l ii is z ij . A particular case to note is the traffic rate x ii , which denotes the traffic rate from peer i to destinations other than the n À 1 peers. This type of traffic can represent data to other parts of the Internet, wherein peer i has to send the data through the ISP. Since there is no established private link to those outsiders, peer i can only rely on the ISP link for the traffic transmission. Therefore,
For ease of presentation, let z i ¼ P n j¼1 z ij denote the aggregate traffic rate that peer i sends through the ISP link and let z ¼ P n j¼1 z j denote the aggregate traffic on the ISP link from all n peers.
To transmit data across the ISP, peers need to pay the network operators for the transmission service. The price per unit bandwidth through the ISP link l ii is P i , which is determined by the ISP. Peer i can also send the traffic y ij through the private link l ij , and the price per unit bandwidth is p ij , which can be mutually agreed upon between peers i and j. In this work, we do not consider the issues on the cost of setting up peering links, since it is not part of the operating cost. We assume that peers can utilize existing peer links with fixed capacities c ij 's. For convenience, we denoteỹ i ¼ ðy i1 ; y i2 ; . . . ; y in Þ as the traffic rate vector for peer i through its private links, andz i ¼ ðz i1 ; z i2 ; . . . ; z in Þ as the traffic rate vector for peer i through the ISP link. We denoteP ¼ ðP 1 ; P 2 ; . . . ; P n Þ as the vector of ISP prices set on different peers.
Besides paying the ISP for the transmission service, each peer also needs to take into consideration of the congestion costs on the links. If we assume that all links can be represented by an M/M/1 model, as in [2] , one can take the delay on the link as its congestion indication or cost. Rather than informing all peers about the current transmission rate z on the ISP link (which can be considered as confidential information by a peer), the ISP will do a precomputation of our proposed algorithm and announce its bandwidth allocation to peer i as C i . There is also a technical merit for this announcement, which will be discussed in detail in later sections. Under this form of setting, the congestion cost
To model the economic incentives and behaviors of all peers, we consider the following optimization. The objective of peer i is to maximize the following function:
s:t: 0 y ij c ij for all j 6 ¼ i;
where 1 fpg is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the condition p is true; otherwise, it is 0. The objective function of (1) represents the economic incentive for peer i to perform traffic transmission. Here, w ij logð1 þ y ij þ z ij Þ is the happiness of peer i by sending traffic to peer j. The term
CiÀzi is the congestion cost of peer i on the ISP link. The variable > 0 indicates the impact of congestion cost to a peer, and it converts the congestion cost of a peer into a monetary value. The larger the value of , the more the peers' concern on the congestion cost. In later sections, we also show the simulation results indicating the impact of on the convergence point of the traffic transmission rates. However, if peer i does not transmit through the ISP link, it does not bear the delay load, and the congestion cost will be zero. The term P i z i is the total payment of peer i to the ISP. Similarly, c ij Ày ij is the congestion cost on the peering link connecting peer i to peer j when the transmission rate on l ij is nonzero. Last, peer i has a payment of p ij y ij to peer j for using the private link.
2 Now, the happiness, congestion cost, and payment are mapped to the same monetary domain with w ij and . If the parameters w ij , , C i , P i , c ij , and p ij are set properly, peer i's happiness, congestion cost, and payment can be measured in monetary units.
Meanwhile, the constraints represented in (2) define the feasible region of this optimization problem. The first are the nonnegative and capacity constraints of the peering links. The second constraint is due to the absence of peering links established to the "outsiders." The third and fourth are the capacity and nonnegative constraints of the ISP link, respectively. In summary, each peer i needs to determine the proper traffic rates vectorsz i andỹ i so as to maximize its aggregate utility in (1).
Note that the optimization processes of different peers are not independent. For each peer i, given the bandwidth allocation C i of the ISP link, it performs an optimization, determines its optimal transmission rate z i , and bids to the ISP. After collecting the bidding information from all peers, the ISP will calculate the new bandwidth allocation according to the new biddings, as well as different resource allocation criteria (which is to be discussed in Section 5). Therefore, the interaction process between peers can be modeled as a noncooperative game such that each peer offers a bid to maximize its own utility.
Under this framework, for a given ISP price vector P ¼ ðP 1 ; P 2 ; . . . ; P n Þ, this defines a noncooperative game between these n peers [19] . They interact with each other and determine their optimal transmission rates periodically and asynchronously. Given the existence of an equilibrium point, the operating point for n peers is the solution to the Nash equilibrium of this game. For each price vectorP > 0, a Nash equilibrium point for this n-peers game is defined as two n-tuples y Ã ¼ ðỹ for any other feasible traffic vector y ¼ ðỹ 1 ;ỹ 2 ; . . . ;ỹ n Þ and z ¼ ðz 1 ;z 2 ; . . . ;z n Þ that satisfies the constraints defined in (2).
2. It is also possible for us to model the case that peers i and j do not charge each other for sending peering traffic, that is, by setting p ij ¼ p ji ¼ 0.
On the other hand, the ISP is associated with a revenue maximization problem:
ðPÞ is the aggregate traffic on the ISP link at the Nash equilibrium. Here, note that we assume that the ISP charges the same price for all peers, and there is no price discriminate. Therefore, P i ¼ P for all i's. This equivalently defines a Stackelberg game [19] with one leader (ISP) and the noncooperative Nash followers (n peers). The ISP has the first-move advantage of determining the optimal price such that its own revenue can be maximized.
MAXIMIZATION BY INDIVIDUAL PEERS WITH TRAFFIC DEMAND IS A CONSTANT
The traffic demand x ij can be viewed as an aggregate request from the customers of peer i destined to peer j and is a constant within an operating period. Consider also the case when peer i can always obtain a sufficient bandwidth capacity to transmit all the aggregate requests; that is,
Then, the peer will transmit all the requests while maximizing its utility at the same time. With fixed traffic demands x ij 's, the aggregate happiness P j A ij ðx ij Þ is therefore a constant. The objective function of peer i can then be transformed to minimize the aggregate congestion costs and payments. Substituting y ij ¼ x ij À z ij in (1), we have the following transformed optimization:
The objective of the new optimization problem (5) is to minimize the aggregate congestion costs and payments under constant traffic demands. The variable transmission rate vectorỹ i is absorbed, and the remaining variable in the new optimization problem isz i . The constraints in (6) represent the feasible region of the ISP link transmission rates. The first constraints give the lower and upper bounds for z ij 's. When c ij ! x ij , the bandwidth in the private peering link l ij is larger than the demand x ij ; that is, the private peering link capacity is sufficient for the demand, and so, the minimum transmission rate in ISP link z ij is zero. When c ij < x ij , the bandwidth in the private peering link is insufficient for the demand, and so, part of the traffic must go through the ISP link. It makes the minimum value of z ij ¼ x ij À c ij . The second constraint again is due to the absence of private peering link to the "outsiders." The third constraint is the ISP link capacity constraint.
Distributed Solution of the Minimization Problem
In the following, we illustrate how a peer, say, i, can determine its transmission rates, that is,z i , rates to other peers via the ISP's link, as well asỹ i , rates to other peers via private peering links so as to minimize its cost when the bandwidth supply is sufficient. Assuming that the peer knows the price P i specified by the ISP and the associated bandwidth allocation C i , one can model an individual peer's behavior as a convex optimization problem, as defined in (5) . Let us first study the necessary and boundary conditions for a peer to minimize the cost. Necessary conditions with a positive transmission rate. Since the cost V i is discontinuous at z ij ¼ x ij (that is, the transmission rate through the private peering link l ij is zero) and z i ¼ 0 (that is, the transmission rate through the ISP link is zero), we first investigate the necessary conditions when z ij 6 ¼ x ij , and z i 6 ¼ 0. The optimization problem in (5) has n À 1 variables (with z ii ¼ x ii ). The firstand second-order partial derivatives with respect to z ij and z ik for k 6 ¼ j 6 ¼ i are
This shows that the Hessian matrix of the objective function in (5) is positive definite on the nonnegative space bounded by the capacity constraints x ij À c ij z ij x ij and z i C i . Thus, the cost V i is strictly convex in z ij for all j 6 ¼ i. The minimum cost and optimizer to this problem are unique and can be found by the Lagrangian method. The necessary conditions of z ij for the minimization of V i are
Boundary cases to the maximization problem. Due to the discontinuity of the objective function, the necessary conditions given above may not achieve the global minimum. Here, we explore the boundary cases when the transmission rates are zero; that is, z ij ¼ x ij , or z i ¼ 0. implies that the private peering link capacity is adequate for the transmission demand, and Fig. 2b considers if x ij > c ij , which implies that the private peering link capacity is inadequate for the transmission demand. In Fig. 2 , the minimum point of the curve is at P 1 when z ij ¼ z Ã ij . We first consider the upper bound. When z ij ¼ x ij , the transmission rate goes through the ISP link only. The congestion cost in peering link l ij is not considered and is subtracted from V i , so P 3, rather than P 2, is the point of V i when z ij ¼ x ij . We then consider the lower bound under two cases. Case 1 is that when x ij c ij (as in Fig. 2a) , the minimum value of z ij ¼ 0. If there is a z ik > 0 for some k 6 ¼ j, P 4 is the point when z ij ¼ 0. However, if the aggregate traffic through the ISP link is zero z i ¼ 0, P 5 is the point when z ij ¼ 0. Note that the congestion cost in the ISP link is subtracted from V i in this case. Case 2 is that when x ij > c ij (as in Fig. 2b) , the minimum value of z ij ¼ x ij À c ij . This is because the maximum amount of traffic through the private peering link is r ij , the remaining rate x ij À c ij has to go through the ISP link, and the congestion cost in the ISP link must be considered. In general, when z Ã ij is in the feasible range, the optimal transmission rate is Fig. 3 illustrates the case when z
¼ 0g is not in the feasible range. Fig. 3a considers the case when z Ã ij minf0; ðx ij À c ij Þg. As V i is strictly convex in z ij , the minimum feasible z ij ¼ minf0; ðx ij À c ij Þg is either at P 4 (when z i > 0) or at P 5 (when z i ¼ 0). For the upper bound of z ij , when z ij ¼ x ij , the congestion cost in the private peering link is subtracted from the cost. This concludes that the minimum point of V i is either when z ij ¼ minf0; ðx ij À c ij Þg (the optimizer is either P 4 or P 5) or when z ij ¼ x ij (the optimizer is P 3). Fig. 3b shows the case when z Ã ij > x ij . The maximum feasible z ij ¼ x ij due to the convexity of V i . For the lower bound of z ij , when z i ¼ 0 (which implies that z ij ¼ 0), the value of V i at P 5 may be smaller than that at P 3. This concludes that the minimum point of V i is either P 3 when z ij ¼ x ij or P 5 when z ij ¼ 0. Last, after the ISP link transmission rates z ij 's are computed, the private peering link transmission rates y ij 's can be found by y ij ¼ x ij À z ij .
SOLUTION TO THE GENERAL CASE OF MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM BY INDIVIDUAL PEERS
In this section, we illustrate how a peer, say, i, can determine its transmission rates, which isz i , to other peers via the ISP, and the transmission rateỹ i , rates to other peers via peering links, so as to maximize its utility. Assuming that the peer knows the price P specified by the ISP and the associated bandwidth allocation C i , one can model an individual peer's behavior as a convex optimization problem, as defined in (1). In this section, we investigate the necessary and boundary conditions for a peer to maximize its utility.
Necessary Conditions with Positive Transmission Rate
Since U i is discontinuous at y ij ¼ 0 (that is, the traffic rate through the peering link l ij is zero) and z i ¼ 0 (that is, the traffic rate through the ISP's link l ii is zero), we first investigate the necessary conditions when y ij 6 ¼ 0, and z i 6 ¼ 0. The optimization problem in (1) has 2n À 1 variables (with y ii ¼ 0). We first write down the second-order partial derivatives with respect to y ij and z ij :
For k 6 ¼ i 6 ¼ j, the second-order partial derivatives of (1) with respect to y ik and z ik are
Therefore, the Hessian matrix [1] of the objective function in (1) is negative definite on the nonnegative value bounded by y ij c ij and z i C i . Thus, U i is strictly concave in y ij and z ij for all j's. The maximum utility and optimizer to this problem is unique and can be found by the Lagrangian method [21] . The necessary conditions of y ij and z ij for the maximization of U i are
Boundary Cases
Due to the discontinuity of the objective function, the necessary conditions given above may not achieve the global maximum. Here, we are going to explore the boundary cases when the transmission rate tends to be zero; that is, y ij ¼ 0, or z i ¼ 0. Fig. 4 shows the illustration of an example. We plot the utility of peer i against one particular variable y ij (z ij is similar). Fig. 4a corresponds to the case when @U i @yijj y ij ¼0 < 0. The optimizer is y ij ¼ 0, but the maximum utility is at point P 1 rather than point P 2 , since there is no congestion cost at the private link when y ij ¼ 0. Fig. 4b corresponds to (P 3 in the figure) . If the utility U i at the boundary point P 2 is less than P 3 , P 3 is the maximum point, and y Ã ij is the optimizer. However, there exists a case when the utility U i at the boundary point P 1 is greater than that of point P 3 . Therefore, P 1 should be the maximum point, and y ij ¼ 0 is the optimizer.
Here, we provide the physical interpretation of the two cases illustrated in Fig. 4b . If the utility U i at the boundary point is P 2 , it indicates that when the transmission rate y ij increases, the increase in happiness outweighs the increases in congestion cost and its total payment, thus achieving the maximum utility at point P 3 . However, if the utility U i at the boundary point is P 1 , it means that when the transmission rate increases, the increase in happiness cannot compensate for the increases in congestion cost and its payments. That is, although peer i achieves the maximum utility at P 3 , the utility is negative. Thus, the best strategy for peer i is not to transmit data through l ij at all. Note that when a peer i does not send through any links, it gets a zero happiness, zero congestion cost, zero payment, and, thus, a zero utility. Therefore, a peer will always achieve a nonnegative utility, since in the worst case, it can opt not to transmit and leave the network (or market).
Example of a Peer's Strategy
Let us end this section with a simple example to illustrate the peer's optimization strategy. There are three peers in the network. Each peer has two private links connecting to other peers with a homogeneous capacity c ij ¼ 5 and the same unit price p ij ¼ 1. The happiness weighting coefficients for peer 1 are w 11 ¼ 10, w 12 ¼ 5, and w 13 ¼ 1, respectively. The mapping variable ¼ 1. ISP allocates a capacity C 1 ¼ 20 to peer 1. The unit price for the ISP link is P ¼ 1.
To find out the optimal rate vectors of peer 1, we list out the necessary conditions with a positive transmission rate:
Solving the system of equations gives the optimal rate vectors ofỹ 1 ¼ f0; 0g andz 1 ¼ f8:8; 3:9; 0g, and utility U 1 ¼ 20:07. Finally, we need to compare this with the utility achieved at the boundary points, as elaborated in Fig. 4b , to make sure that the rate vectors really achieve the global optimal.
DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE ALLOCATION BY ISP
From an ISP's point of view, a monopolized use of its link bandwidth surely reduces its customer size and so increases the risk of the business. Moreover, in order to maximize its revenue, an ISP has to know approximately the demand of its link bandwidth. Therefore, an ISP wants to have an efficient resource allocation algorithm. Now, given the total amount of resource nC (ISP's link bandwidth), the ISP needs to determine how this common resource can be distributed to all the n peers. In this section, we propose two different resource allocation algorithms that can be adopted by the ISP. Before we proceed to the formal presentation of the algorithms, let us illustrate the general framework, under which the ISP can interact with peers so that the ISP is able to discover the actual resource demands from peers, and also, peers are informed about the pricing information and the available resources. Fig. 5 illustrates the general framework. Initially, the ISP equally distributes its capacity to all peers at time t ¼ 0. Each peer i calculates its optimal traffic transmission rates based on the currently allocated ISP capacity C i and the ISP link price P. Then, the peer reports its transmission rate (resource usage) z i back to the ISP. We refer the feedback information z i as the bidding of peer i. The ISP receives the biddings from peers within a period of time T . At the end of each period, ISP recomputes the link resource distribution and sends the new bandwidth allocation C i to peer i, where i 2 f1; . . . ; ng. Based on the new bandwidth allocation, peers calculate their optimal transmission rates again, and the process repeats.
There are two advantages for this framework. First, all the information that a peer i requires are the unit prices p ij 's and capacities c ij 's of its private links and the allocated link capacity C i , as well as the informed price P. These can be seen as the private information of peer i. Peer i does not have to know the bandwidth allocation fC 1 ; . . . ; C n g and transmission rates fz 1 ; . . . ; z n g of all other peers, which is considered as confidential information. On the other hand, when the ISP makes the bandwidth allocation, what it requires to know are the biddings ðz 1 ; z 2 ; . . . ; z n Þ from all peers. The ISP may not know the utility functions and the information about the private links of these peers (that is, p ij and c ij for all i, j). Second, the overhead of information exchange in this framework is small. The ISP only needs to inform each peer about its allocated capacity, whereas each peer only needs to reply its bidding to the ISP.
In the following, we present two resource allocation algorithms, by which the ISP can determine the appropriate capacity C i for all peers i, i ¼ 1; Á Á Á ; n.
Proportional Share Algorithm (PSA)
Under the PSA, the ISP distributes its remaining capacity proportionally to the biddings of peers received within each period. Initially, ISP distributes its capacity equally to every peer, that is, C i ¼ nC n ¼ C for all i. The ISP sends this information to every peer. Upon receiving the information from the ISP, each peer uses the algorithm proposed in Section 4 to find its optimal transfer rates (that is, z i for peer i) and sends it back to the ISP as a bidding for the ISP link resource. At the end of a period, the ISP gathers all the feedback from peers. Under the PSA algorithm, ISP first allocates to each peer the amount of bandwidth equal to the peer's bidding. 3 Then, the ISP distributes the remaining resource proportionally to the biddings of the peers. Formally, we have
The algorithm of the PSA is depicted as follows:
Proportional Share Algorithm 1. ISP initiates C When the ISP link capacity is sufficiently large to support the demand from all peers, the traffic rate vectors of all peers and the resource biddings will converge quickly. However, if there is insufficient amount of resource (for example, the happiness weighting coefficients of peers are large, whereas the ISP link capacity is limited), the peers with the largest happiness coefficients (that is, w ij ) may be able to monopolize all the ISP capacity, leaving no capacity left for other peers. Note that even when this monopoly occurs, the ISP is still maximizing its profit under the PSA policy. However, this outcome may not be undesirable for the ISP, since it may not want to have a single peer as its customer or a small number of peers to monopolize all its resource. This drawback motivates the following algorithm.
Equal Share Algorithm (ESA)
Under ESA, ISP distributes its remaining capacity equally among all peers after satisfying their bandwidth consumption demands indicated by their biddings. Initially, ISP distributes its capacity equally to every peer, that is, C i ¼ C for all i, and sends the capacity distribution C i to every peer i. Upon receiving the information from the ISP, each peer uses the algorithm proposed in Section 4 to find its optimal transfer rates (that is, z i for peer i) and sends the information back to the ISP as its resource bidding. Within the following period, the ISP gathers all the feedbacks from peers. The ISP first allocates to each peer the capacity that it bids, and then, the ISP distributes the remaining resource equally to the peers. Formally, we have
The algorithm of the ESA is described as follows:
Equal Share Algorithm (ESA) 1. ISP initiates C 
Illustration of ISP Resource Allocation
To illustrate the effectiveness and performance of the above algorithms, we carry out two experiments and illustrate the resource distribution under two different scenarios, namely, 1) the ISP has sufficient capacity and 2) the ISP has insufficient capacity.
The first experiment illustrates the case when ISP has a sufficient resource. There are three peers in the network. Each peer has two private links to other peers in the system, with capacity c ij ¼ 10 and a unit price p ij ¼ 1. Peers 1, 2, and 3 have different values of happiness weighting coefficients w 1j ¼ 10, w 2j ¼ 15, and w 3j ¼ 20 for j ¼ 1; 2; 3. The ISP provides a link with capacity nC ¼ 100 and charges a unit price of P ¼ 1:5. The ISP updates the distribution and sends signals to peers every 1 sec. Then, every peer computes its own optimal transmission rates routing based on the method in Section 4. Fig. 6 shows the bidding of each peer during the experiment. The ISP uses PSA in Figs. 6a, 6b , and 6c and uses ESA in Figs. 6d, 6e, and 6f. The vertical axis shows the biddings of each peer, and the horizontal axis shows the time. When the value of is small, peers offer the same biddings, no matter if ISP uses PSA or ESA, and the biddings converge within a few periods. However, when ¼ 50, PSA results in a monopolization of resource, and ESA does not. Let us explain here. When increases, the peers have larger concerns in the quality of service (QoS; congestion cost) of the link. They would rather pay more for better transmission service, and they choose to send the traffic through the ISP link and so give higher biddings. Note that the utilities of peers are actually decreasing, even if they give higher biddings. When the value of is larger enough, ¼ 50 here, the demands in the ISP link is larger than the supply, PSA results in the monopolization of the ISP link, and peer 1 can only send traffic through peering links.
The second experiment illustrates the case when the ISP has an insufficient resource. There are three peers in the network. Each peer has two private links to each other, with capacity c ij ¼ 10 and unit price p ij ¼ 1. Peers 1, 2, and 3 have different values of happiness weighting coefficients w 1j ¼ 100, w 2j ¼ 150 and w 3j ¼ 200 for j ¼ 1; 2; 3. Note that here, the happiness weighting coefficients are much larger than in the previous experiment, meaning that peers have stronger desires to transmit traffic. Thus, keeping the ISP link capacity at the same level leads to an insufficient resource supply. The ISP provides a link with capacity nC ¼ 100 and charges a unit price of P ¼ 1:5. The ISP updates the distribution and sends a signal to peers every 1 second. Then, every peer computes its own optimal transmission rates routing based on the method in Section 4. Fig. 7 shows the bidding of each peer during the experiment. The ISP uses PSA in Figs. 7a, 7b , and 7c and uses ESA in Figs. 7d, 7e , and 7f. The vertical axis shows the biddings of each peer, and the horizontal axis is the time axis. The experiment runs for 1,000 sec for results in Figs. 7a, 7b, and 7c and 2,000 seconds for results in Figs. 7d, 7e , and 7f. When ISP uses the PSA policy, whether ¼ 1; 5; or 50, peer 3 monopolizes the whole ISP link resource, and peers 1 and 2 can only send through private links. This is because peer 3 has the largest happiness weighting coefficient. It has the largest tolerance in congestion and bids the largest to the ISP. Under PSA, the ISP then shifts some of peer 1's resource to peer 3. The congestion cost in the ISP link of peer 1 increases, and so, peer 1 gives a smaller bidding and is further allocated less resource. This propagates until peer 1's congestion cost in transmitting in the ISP link is larger than its happiness, and it gives zero bidding. The same happens to peer 2 and finally causes the monopolization of the ISP link resource. Therefore, peers 1 and 2 have to shift their traffic to the private links and, thus, peer 3 finally monopolizes the ISP bandwidth. On the other hand, when ISP uses ESA, the three peers share the ISP link, and there is no monopolization.
Remarks. In this section, we show two algorithms for an ISP to distribute its capacity resource among the peers. Both PSA and ESA are efficient, but PSA may result in a monopolized utilization of the resource by a small number of peers. In contrast, ESA can prevent this undesirable outcome. Note that the monopoly of the ISP resource in PSA can be prevented if some proper upper limits on the peer's bandwidths are set. However, since Section 4 considers the maximum traffic loading of local ISP, we do not enforce any upper limits here. For all simulations, we see that the allocations from the ISP and the biddings from peers converge. However, the convergence point of the Nash equilibrium is not easy to prove theoretically. We formulate the allocations from the ISP and biddings from peers at period t as a function, and the output is the new allocations and biddings, that is, C The domain and range of this function is in the 2n-dimensional space of ½0; nC. However, the function is discontinuous at0, and so, a fixed-point theorem may not be applicable here.
ISP: MAXIMIZATION OF ITS REVENUE
In this section, we investigate various approaches for an ISP to maximize its revenue. The revenue of an ISP is the aggregate payments received from n peers for consuming the ISP's link bandwidth. Formally, the ISP's revenue can be expressed as
Here, z i ðPÞ indicates that one peer's bandwidth consumption on the ISP link is a function of the price P set by the ISP. It is obvious that if the price is set too high, peers may switch their traffic to the private links where the service is cheaper. Thus, the ISP's revenue reduces. On the other hand, a lower price may attract peers to send more traffic via the ISP; however, too low a price may not ensure an increase in the total revenue. These characteristics leave the door open for ISP to search for an optimal price to ensure the maximization of its revenue. Normally, it only makes sense for the ISP to obtain the optimal price in a "blind search" manner. That is, the ISP randomly proposes a price to see the aggregate bandwidth consumption z at the equilibrium point. After finding its revenue at this pricing level, the ISP may adjust its price a little bit to see how it affects its total revenue. With the feedback information, the ISP can readjust its price. However, this type of "local search" method may not ensure the global optimality, and it can be very time consuming. Thus, a natural question arises: Is there any effective approach for an ISP to find its optimal price, assuming that the ISP can estimate some necessary information about the system, for example, the happiness weighting coefficients of peers ðw ij ; 8i; jÞ, capacities, and unit prices of the private links?
Instead of doing a blind search on the unit price P to maximize the revenue, we propose an efficient method for estimating the optimal price. This method requires a quick estimation of the aggregate traffic z, given a fixed ISP link price P, rather than implementing the price and waiting for an equilibrium point to reach. With the estimation of z, we can easily calculate the ISP's revenue for a given P, which provides a possibility for us to carry out the pricing search to be introduced shortly.
Before we proceed to the presentation of the pricing search method, let us first illustrate how an ISP can estimate its aggregate bandwidth consumption with a price P. This estimation has three assumptions. First, the ISP applies the ESA in resource distribution. As shown previously, ESA can avoid the resource monopoly by a single peer. Second, the ISP takes an indiscriminate pricing approach and charges the same unit price of P to all peers. Third, when the ISP maximizes its revenue, it only considers the case of z ij > 0 for all i, j, which means that all peers want to transfer data via the ISP's links.
Estimation of Aggregate Traffic z on ISP Link
The estimate of the aggregate bandwidth consumption or the aggregate biddings is complicated. To ease the computation, we will later introduce a variable k, which stands for the marginal increases in congestion cost plus the unit price. The purpose of the variable k is that one can relate the aggregate bidding z in terms of k. To find an estimate of the revenue RðPÞ with a unit price P, the ISP first estimates the value of k. Then, it can have the estimates of the peers' aggregate biddings and its revenue RðPÞ. Now, we introduce the procedure for estimating the aggregate biddings of peers z with a unit price P. At the equilibrium point of the peers' biddings under ESA, we have
Substituting (10) into the necessary conditions in (8), we obtain
Let us now introduce the variable k, which is
We have two cases to consider: y ij > 0 and y ij ¼ 0. First, let us consider the case when y ij > 0 for all i 6 ¼ j.
Equations (12), (11) , and (13) become
where W is the sum of all happiness weighting coefficients of peers ð W ¼ P i P j w ij Þ. Now, we can equate (15) and (19), and we have
Rearranging, we have
where
¼i c ij is the aggregate capacities in the system, and p av ¼ 1 nðnÀ1Þ
j6 ¼i p ij is the mean of p ij . We have the estimate of (20) if the variance of unit prices of private links is small.
Having some information of the happiness weighting coefficients, capacities, and unit prices of private links, the ISP can estimate the value of k by using (20) and can then estimate the aggregate biddings z with (15) and its revenue RðPÞ with (9) . Now, let us consider the second case when y ij ¼ 0 for all i 6 ¼ j. Equations (11) and (12) give a necessary condition of k, which is
Substituting (10), (12), (13), and (15) into
Again, the ISP can compute the value of k with (22) with a cubic formula [4] . Then, it can estimate the aggregate biddings z with (15) and its revenue RðPÞ with (9). Remarks. We presented the procedure for an ISP to estimate the aggregate demand of traffic from its customers and its revenue, with a fixed unit price of its bandwidth P.
Optimal Pricing Search Method
Before going into the pricing search method, we first provide an intuition of the method. When the unit price of the ISP link ðPÞ is small, an increase in the price only reduces the aggregate biddings of the peers z slightly. Thus, the ISP has an increase of revenue as the loss in the decreasing bidding is covered by the gain in the increment of unit price. The increase of revenue vanishes when the marginal point is reached, where the gain from increasing unit price can no longer cover the loss from the decreasing demand.
The proposed pricing search method is divided into two phases. The purpose of phase 1 is to find a feasible range of the optimum unit price, with the help of the estimation of aggregate traffic in Section 6.1. Phase 2 aims at reducing the size of the feasible range obtained in phase 1 by a trisection method. The method is depicted as follows:
. 17. else if ðRðP 2 Þ > RðP 3 ÞÞ 18. update P 4 ¼ P 3 , P 3 ¼ P 2 and P 2 ¼ P1þP3 2 . 19. } /Ã termination of while-loop of phase 2 Ã/ Initially, the ISP chooses a step size and a threshold . In phase 1, the ISP finds four unit prices based on such that P 1 ¼ , P 2 ¼ 2P 1 , P 3 ¼ 2P 2 , and P 4 ¼ 2P 3 . Then, it estimates the revenues at these four prices: RðP 1 Þ, RðP 2 Þ, RðP 3 Þ, and RðP 4 Þ. If RðP 3 Þ > RðP 4 Þ, it means that we have found the feasible range ½P 1 ; P 4 and go to phase two. Otherwise, if RðP 3 Þ RðP 4 Þ, we update ¼ 2 and go back to phase 1. The stopping criteria bases on the assumption that a local optimal price is also the global optimal price. Thus, a decrease in the revenue when the price is increasing notes the ending of phase 1.
In phase 2, we aim at reducing the feasible range obtained in the last phase to be within our threshold by the trisection method. We compare the two revenues RðP 2 Þ and RðP 3 Þ. If RðP 2 Þ RðP 3 Þ, the optimum unit price is in between ½P 2 ; P 4 . This is again based on the assumption that a local optimal price is also the global optimal price. Thus, we update P 1 ¼ P 2 and P 2 ¼ P 3 , and
. If RðP 2 Þ > RðP 3 Þ, the optimum unit price is in the range ½P 1 ; P 3 , and we update P 4 ¼ P 3 , P 3 ¼ P 2 , and P 2 ¼ P 1 þP 3 2 . Phase 2 ends when the size of the range P 4 À P 1 < (the threshold). Fig. 8 illustrates the procedure of the search. In  Fig. 8a , the ISP estimates the revenues at four prices: P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , and P 4 . In Fig. 8b , RðP 3 Þ > RðP 4 Þ marks the end of phase 1 and enters phase 2. As RðP 2 Þ > RðP 3 Þ, we prune out the unfeasible region ½P 3 ; P 4 . In Fig. 8c , we update the prices and find that RðP 2 Þ < RðP 3 Þ, so we prune out the unfeasible region ½P 1 ; P 2 . Fig. 8d shows the remaining feasible region and updated the price of Fig. 8c .
Remarks. We introduced a method for an ISP to quickly search for the optimal price, in which its revenue is maximized. This optimal price P Ã is only computed once, and the ISP will use this price P Ã in all the iterations of resource allocation.
ISSUE OF NETWORK SCALING
In this section, we seek to further explore the regime when we scale up the network, that is, increasing the number of peers or n ! 1. Studying the behaviors of the ISP and peers in this many-user regime allows us to obtain a fundamental understanding of the relationship between ISPs at different tiers. First, we analyze how the peers' biddings can affect the decision of ISP, that is, the optimal price to maximize its total revenue. Furthermore, the study also enables us to ask (and answer) some interesting yet important questions such as whether the peers have any incentive of setting up a peering relationship between themselves and whether the service provider benefits from upgrading the network (that is, upgrading the backbone capacity) to admit new users so as to increase its revenue.
Our analysis is based on the results previously obtained in Section 6. Equations (20) and (22) specify an estimate of the aggregate demand on the ISP transit services. If the ISP knows the following information, for example, an estimate of the happiness coefficients of all peers, pricing policies, and capacities of the peering links, then it has an opportunity to infer its optimal pricing strategy to maximize its revenue. Although the pricing policy and peers' capacities are generally regarded as business confidential information, which is difficult to obtain, a rough prediction of the distribution on these information can help the ISP make the marketing decision. Another application of (20) and (22) is predicting how the number of peers affects the ISP's maximal revenue and its marginal profit. The answer to this question gives us an important insight into the evolution of future's Internet. For the completeness of presentation, the situation that we consider can be categorized into two cases: 1) there are no peering links between peers and 2) peers set up peering relationships, which result in a meshed peering network.
Network Scaling without Peering Links between Peers
When there is no peering link between peers, peers can only rely on the ISP link to communicate with each other. An interesting question is whether the ISP can arbitrarily monopolize the market. Equivalently, how high a price can the ISP charge to maximize its profit? From the analysis in Section 6, we know that when there is no peering link between peers, that is, y ij ¼ 0, (22) holds, which can be approximated as follows:
wherein w can be estimated as the average happiness coefficient of all peers. The necessary condition for this equation to hold, that is, there is no traffic transfer on peering links, is k c 2 ij þ p ij . This condition satisfies when there are no peering links ðc ij ¼ 0Þ, or the expense for transfer on peering links is too high. Applying the similar approaches that we have discussed in Section 6, one can calculate the ISP's revenue under different values of P and n. Fig. 9 illustrates the ISP's revenue as a function of P for different numbers of peers. Note that in this attempt, we assume that the ISP does not upgrade the link capacity, even when there are more peers joining the network. Thus, we keep nC ¼ 100 for all n.
Some observation is made here. First, given a particular value of n, we can always find out a unique optimal price P Ã that maximizes the ISP's revenue, which is a verification of the results presented in Section 6. The ISP can always increase its profit by raising the service charge from a zero (free) level. Note that as the charge P exceeds a threshold, . Since RðP 2 Þ < RðP 3 Þ, we prune out the region ½P 1 ; P 2 . (d) Update P 1 ¼ P 2 , P 2 ¼ P 3 , and P 3 ¼ the ISP's revenue starts to decrease and eventually falls to zero. In this case, no peer would choose to transmit through the ISP link due to the high price. Another observation made here is the impact of network scale on the ISP's profit. When the scale of the network is small, that is, n 20, the ISP is able to receive more revenue, as more peers require connecting service, which is due to the increase in the service demand. However, when the number of peers exceeds a threshold (n ¼ 20 is a threshold in this illustration), the ISP's maximal revenue tends to decrease. This counterintuitive fact can be explained by the constraint on the limited bandwidth. Since more peers are competing for a fixed ISP capacity, the bandwidth allocation for each peer tends to be very limited. The poor QoS thus prevents them from utilizing the ISP link. Worse yet, when n is sufficiently large, the ISP will not receive any revenue at all. This result verifies again that the ISP's policy should adapt to the changes of the market demand.
In contrast to the case when the capacity of ISP link is kept fixed, we illustrate via Fig. 10 the case when the capacity of the ISP link increases proportionally to the number of peers in the network. Thus, the ISP has a total capacity of nC, where C ¼ 100 is a constant. Fig. 10a illustrates the ISP's revenue as a function of its announced price, under different network scales. This figure shows that if the ISP upgrades its link capacity proportionally to the number of peers, it can always achieve an increasing revenue as n increases, which is a contrast to the fixedcapacity case. Further, the revenue is able to increase faster than n does. Fig. 10b plots the relationship between the ISP's maximal revenue per bandwidth ð zP Ã =nCÞ and the network size n. As shown, the ISP's marginal profit keeps increasing as n grows, implying that the ISP can benefit from upgrading its network, which is a good news for the service providers.
Network Scaling with Peering Links between Peers
In the previous section, we have analyzed the relationship between ISP's revenue and peers' population when there is no outside competition from the peers. Here, we further explore the scenarios when there are peering links between peers, especially when traffic transmission carries out on the peering links. The situation occurs when peers upgrade the capacities of peering links or offer the service at a lower price, thus attracting more traffic to go through the peering links. We seek to answer the following question: Does the conclusion drawn in Section 7.1 still hold under this competitive framework? In Section 6, we have shown that when y ij > 0, (20) holds, subjected to the condition that k ! p ij þ 1=c 2 ij , and P þ n 2 =C 2 < k < w ij . By solving this equation, one can calculate the ISP's revenue for different values of P and n. Similarly, we first explore the case when ISP does not increase its link capacity, even if the number of peers increases; that is, nC ¼ 100 remains a constant. In addition, we perform the analysis under the settings w ij ¼ 10, p ij ¼ 1, and c ij ¼ 10 for all i, j. Fig. 11 illustrates how the number of peers n affects ISP's maximal revenue.
Some observation is made here. When the competition from the peering links is introduced, the ISP's maximal revenue increases initially, but decreases rapidly as the number of peers grows, where n ¼ 5 is the threshold. This is because as n increases, the available ISP bandwidth allocated to each peer is decreasing when the ESA is performed. Peers have to bear a large congestion cost due to the limited bandwidth, which forces them to go through the peering links. This fact provides an indication that ISPs have an incentive of upgrading their network to satisfy the increasing demand for the ISP bandwidth.
Similarly, we also analyze the ISP's benefit from increasing the link capacity. We assume that the ISP's link capacity grows proportionally to the number of peers in the network; that is, the ISP has a total capacity of nC, where C ¼ 100. Fig. 12 illustrates the relationship between the ISP's maximal revenue and the network size. The first observation is that as the number of peers grows, the ISP's maximal revenue keeps increasing. In Fig. 12b , we can also see that the revenue increasing rate is faster than that of n. This confirms that the ISP has the incentive of improving the network infrastructures so as to increase its revenue. However, when compared to the case without peering links, the revenue increasing rate becomes lower as the network size increases. In particular, when n > 200, the increase in profit per bandwidth is very small. This is due to the fact that peers set up peering links to form a mesh network. It is the competition that brings down the ISP's marginal profit. It is worthwhile to mention that in practice, it may be difficult for all peers to form a fully meshed network among themselves. This may be due to the geographical constraint that some peers are located very far apart or may be due to the legal regulations. Thus, there are still great opportunities for ISPs to gain by upgrading the network infrastructures.
RELATED WORK
Let us present a brief review of some related work. There is a large model of works about Internet pricing [17] , [20] , [14] , [15] , [12] , but they are mostly about customer pricing strategy or to provide differentiated service. In [8] and [9] , the authors study the interaction of overlay networks. In this paper, we focus on the "interaction" between the major ISP and local ISPs. In [2] , the authors investigated the revenue maximization and scalability of a service provider. Their work showed that there is rationale for the service provider to upgrade its capacity. However, their model is different from ours in two ways. There is only one common link in the ISP, and each peer considers the congestion cost of that common link. Our model differs from them in a sense that we allow a more realistic representation of today's Internet; that is, we allow peers to have private links so as to reduce their cost. In [22] , the authors proposed a model consisting of local and transit ISPs. They showed that optimal strategy of local ISPs is to play "cooperatively" by threat. Our work found the conditions for every peer to achieve its maximum utility.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the interplay between a higher tier ISP and n local ISPs (which we terms as peers). A peer has a connection to the ISP and, possibly, connected to other peers with some private links. Each peer needs to determine the appropriate amount of traffic via the ISP's link and the private links so as to maximize its utility, and it pays the ISP on a monthly basis. The ISP, on the other hand, needs to perform proper resource allocation so as to avoid resource monopoly and to maximize its revenue. We show the necessary and boundary conditions for the traffic rate vectors of a peer to obtain the maximum utility. We present two distributed algorithms for the ISP to do the resource allocation. Both distributed algorithms converge quickly in case the ISP has sufficient resource. We show how the ISP can estimate its revenue with a unit price, and we also propose a procedure on how an ISP can obtain the optimum unit price so as to maximize its revenue. Finally, we show that the ISP can obtain a higher revenue by upgrading its capacity when we scale up the network. The proposed methodology provides us a systematic way to determine pricing and resource allocation, even when the ISP and peers interact with each other. It is interesting to extend this model to multiple ISPs, since one has to consider the interaction and competitions among these ISPs as well. This will be in our future work. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
